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ABSTRACT 
Ryan J. Jacoby: Behavioral Measurement of Intolerance of Uncertainty in Anxiety Disorders 
(Under the direction of: Jonathan S. Abramowitz) 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) is an important cognitive bias associated with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Yet to date, IU is only 
measured using self-report instruments, and behavioral measures of in vivo uncertainty would 
help our understanding of this construct. Accordingly, the current study examined the validity of 
a probabilistic inference task, the Beads Task, as a behavioral measure of IU in a sample of 
anxiety disorders patients and non-anxious controls. While the Beads Task successfully induced 
task-related uncertainty as the decision became more difficult, contrary to hypotheses, self-
reported IU did not predict performance on this task using observable performance related 
measures (i.e., draws to decision, time to decision). Self-report IU, however, did predict one’s 
subjective experience of in vivo distress after deciding. Decision-related distress was better 
accounted for by general symptom measures than disorder-specific symptoms. Avenues for 
future research based on these findings are discussed. 
 
Key words: Anxiety Disorders, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
Uncertainty, Decision Making, Behavioral Assessment, Adulthood (18 yrs & older) 
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BEHAVIORAL MEASUREMENT OF INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY IN 
ANXIETY DISORDERS 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has been defined as “a cognitive bias that affects how a 
person perceives, interprets, and responds to uncertain situations on a cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral level” (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004, p. 835). It specifically refers to “beliefs 
about the necessity of being certain, about the capacity to cope with unpredictable change, and 
about adequate functioning in situations which are inherently ambiguous” (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997, p. 678). Individuals who are high in IU have a 
lower perceptual threshold of ambiguity; find uncertainty to be stressful and upsetting; believe 
that uncertainty is negative, reflects poorly on a person, and should be avoided; and have 
difficulty functioning in uncertain or ambiguous situations (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Krohne, 1993). 
They also tend to apply ineffective problem solving strategies in uncertain situations, 
overestimate the possibility of unpredictable negative events, and make threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous information (Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). Given the 
ubiquity of ambiguity and uncertainty in everyday life, individuals high in IU tend to experience 
heightened daily distress.  
IU is considered an important domain of dysfunctional cognition associated with anxiety 
disorders, especially obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, 1997) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 
2004). In OCD, it is one of the core cognitive biases involved in the misinterpretation of 
unwanted intrusive thoughts that leads to the development and maintenance of obsessions and 
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compulsions (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997). For example, a person 
high in IU with OCD might misinterpret a normally occurring senseless intrusive image (e.g., a 
loved one involved in an accident) in ways that lead to obsessional anxiety, preoccupation, and 
compulsive checking behavior (e.g., “I must be certain that this accident hasn’t happened”), 
which only further maintain the obsessional thinking and need for certainty (e.g., Rachman, 
2002; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006). 
Empirical studies with clinical and nonclinical samples consistently indicate a 
relationship between self-reported IU and OC symptoms (Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Calleo, Hart, 
Björgvinsson, & Stanley, 2010; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Holaway, Heimberg, & 
Coles, 2006; Jacoby, Fabricant, Leonard, Riemann, & Abramowitz, 2013; Mahoney & McEvoy, 
2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011, 2012; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003). Moreover, 
this relationship is not accounted for by other variables such as depression, anxiety sensitivity, or 
worry (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998); and some studies suggest that individuals with OCD 
have higher levels of IU than do those with other anxiety disorders (Steketee et al., 1998; Tolin, 
Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006). These findings indicate that IU is indeed a cognitive distortion 
with some specific relevance to OCD.  
A highly heterogeneous condition, OCD consists of four empirically derived theme-based 
symptom dimensions: contamination, responsibility for harm, unacceptable thoughts, and 
order/symmetry (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2010; McKay et al., 2004). In studies examining 
associations between IU and particular OCD symptom themes, IU appears to be most strongly 
related to doubting obsessions and checking compulsions (Abramowitz, Nelson, Purdon, Antony, 
& Summerfeldt, 2007; Calleo et al., 2010; Holaway et al., 2006; Jacoby et al., 2013; Overton & 
Menzies, 2002; Tolin et al., 2003), yet it is also associated to some extent with the other 
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presentations of OCD (Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006; Calleo et al., 2010; Holaway et al., 2006; 
Jacoby et al., 2013; Tolin, Brady, & Hannan, 2008; Wheaton, Abramowitz, Berman, Riemann, & 
Hale, 2010). 
Theoretical models of GAD posit that the extreme worry represents attempts to control 
the uncertainty associated with feared future situations (Dugas, Buhr, et al., 2004; Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, & Dugas, 1994). In support of this theory, a large body of research provides 
evidence supporting a strong association between self-reported IU and worry in both 
undergraduate and clinical samples, even after controlling for various demographic and clinical 
factors (e.g., Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
1997; Dugas et al., 2001; Dugas, Schwartz, et al., 2004; Fergus & Wu, 2010; Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012; Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005; Sexton, 
Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). More severe GAD symptoms are also associated with greater 
self-reported IU (Dugas et al., 2007), and several studies have found that IU is specifically 
related to GAD and worry more so than to other psychological disorders (Dugas et al., 2001; 
Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Dugas, Schwartz, et al., 2004). Finally, experimental 
manipulation of IU has been found to increase worry, which suggests a possible causal 
association between the two variables (de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2006; Grenier & Ladouceur, 
2004; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). 
Although the majority of theoretical and empirical work on IU has focused on its 
association with OCD and GAD symptoms (including some studies finding no differences in 
self-reported IU between these conditions; Fergus & Wu, 2010; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; 
Holaway et al., 2006), IU is associated with numerous other conditions, such as panic disorder 
(Dugas et al., 2001; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; Norton et al., 
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2005), health anxiety (Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Deacon & Abramowitz, 2008; Fergus & 
Valentiner, 2011; Norton et al., 2005), social anxiety (e.g., Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, 
Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012), 
neuroticism (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012), trait anxiety (Khawaja & Yu, 2010), eating disorders 
(Sternheim, Konstantellou, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011; Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011), 
hoarding (Oglesby et al., 2013), and depression (Dugas, Schwartz, et al., 2004; Norton et al., 
2005; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010). Thus, IU might represent a transdiagnostic cognitive 
vulnerability (Carleton et al., 2012). Accordingly, there is a need for additional research to 
establish the extent to which IU is unique to GAD or OCD, or common to a broad range of 
psychopathology. 
An important limitation of the existing research on IU, however, is that studies rely 
almost exclusively on two self-report measures of this construct, the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (IUS) and the Perfectionism/Certainty subscale of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire 
(OBQ-PC; both described further below).
1
 Yet while these scales are psychometrically valid, the 
literature would benefit from methodologically varied measurement of IU. The Beads Task, a 
probabilistic inference task that involves deciding from which jar a series of beads has been 
drawn, has been conceptualized as a behavioral measure of IU (Ladouceur et al., 1997): 
individuals who are high in IU are expected to require more pieces of information (i.e., more 
beads) before they feel certain enough to make a decision. 
                                                        
1
 The Intolerance of Uncertainty Index (IUI) (Carleton, Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010; Gosselin 
et al., 2008) is a more recently developed measure of IU that has been less widely used in the 
literature. The IUI is more symptom-focused and was developed for use as a clinical outcome 
measure whereas the IUS-12 and the OBQ-44 were both designed as research constructs to be 
used in clinical and non-clinical populations. Thus, the latter two questionnaires are the focus of 
the current study. 
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In the original Yes-No version of the Beads Task (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; 
Phillips & Edwards, 1966), participants were shown two jars holding 100 beads of two different 
colors in a particular ratio (e.g. 85:15 red to blue vs. 85:15 blue to red). Participants were then 
told that beads were going to be drawn one by one with replacement from one of these two jars, 
and that each jar was equally likely to be chosen. The participant’s task was to decide from 
which jar the beads were being drawn. They were told that they could request as many beads as 
necessary to decide, and were asked after each bead was drawn whether or not they required 
more draws before they came to a decision. The sequence of beads in reality was predetermined 
using a random number generator. The outcome measure was the number of beads participants 
requested before feeling “certain” about making a decision.  
Ladouceur and colleagues (1997) were the first to use the Beads Task as a behavioral 
measure of IU. With an non-clinical sample, these authors found a positive correlation between 
self-reported IU (scores on the IUS) and the number of beads requested in a moderately difficult 
(i.e., moderately ambiguous) version of the task, but not in the high ambiguity version. 
Accordingly, they concluded that especially low and high levels of ambiguity lead to low and 
high levels of uncertainty respectively regardless of IU, and that moderately ambiguous 
situations in particular would distinguish most clearly between individuals high and low in IU.  
Although no studies to date have directly compared IU in patients with anxiety disorders 
using the Beads Task, several studies suggest that individuals with OCD require more evidence 
before making decisions than do individuals with depression, phobias, and non-anxious controls 
(Fear & Healy, 1997; Foa et al., 2003; Milner, Beech, & Walker, 1971; Toffolo, Hout, Hooge, 
Engelhard, & Cath, 2013; Volans, 1976). Similar results have been found with individuals with 
high self-reported worry compared to those with low worry (e.g., Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 
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1991). Most of these studies, however, suffered from methodological limitations such as very 
small sample sizes, the use of overly “easy” versions of the Beads Task (i.e., 85:15 ratios which 
might not have captured differences between those with high and low IU), and, most 
importantly, self-reported IU was never measured or correlated with Beads Task performance. 
Given the gaps and limitations of the existing work on IU, the present study compared 
performance on the Beads Task—with three levels of difficulty/uncertainty—in individuals with 
OCD, GAD, other anxiety disorders (OADs), and non-anxious controls (NACs). The inclusion of 
both OAD and NAC groups allowed us to address whether IU in specific to OCD and GAD, or 
whether it is best conceptualized as a transdiagnostic construct.  
We generally expected that participants would request more beads (i.e., evidence) and 
take more time to decide on more difficult levels of the Beads Task (difficult > intermediate > 
easy), and that they would feel less certain, less confident, and more distressed about their 
decisions. We expected that all versions of the task would be perceived as equally important. The 
first specific aim of the current study was to examine possible differences on Beads Task 
performance across the anxiety disorders. We hypothesized significant differences between 
diagnostic groups on the intermediate version of the task; specifically that the OCD and GAD 
groups would request more beads than the OAD and NAC groups, but not one another. We also 
predicted that the OAD group would request more beads than the NAC group (OCD and GAD > 
OAD > NAC). A second aim was to investigate relationships between self-reported IU and 
performance on the Beads Task. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the number of beads on the 
intermediate version of the task would be significantly correlated with scores on the IUS-12 and 
OBQ-PC even after accounting for depression, anxiety, and stress. The study’s third aim was to 
elucidate relationships between Beads Task performance and particular OCD and GAD 
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symptoms. Specifically, we predicted that responsibility/checking concerns and worry would 
significantly predict the number of beads requested on the intermediate version of the Beads 
Task after controlling for depression, anxiety, and stress (and the other symptom dimensions of 
OCD). 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Sixty-nine adults with anxiety disorders and 26 undergraduates without any psychiatric 
diagnoses participated in the study.
2
 Student participants were recruited from Introduction to 
Psychology classes at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) and received 
one hour of research credit in exchange for their participation. These students composed the non-
anxious control (NAC) group. Clinical participants were recruited from the community via 
letters distributed to local treatment providers, flyers posted locally, and email advertisements. 
Of the clinical sample, 36% (n = 25) met diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder, 32% (n = 
22) for OCD, 4% (n = 3) for PTSD, 41% (n = 28) for GAD, and 25% (n =17) for specific 
phobia
3
. The sample as a whole was primarily female (72.6%, n = 69) and Caucasian (73.7%, n 
= 70); 11.6% African American, 9.5% Asian, 3.2% Latino/Hispanic, and 2.1% Other / 
Multiethnic. The group’s mean age was 28.15 years (SD = 12.94; range = 17 – 69) and the mean 
number of years of education reported was 16.15 (SD = 2.39; range = 10 - 25), suggesting that 
                                                        
2
 Of the 100 individuals who were screened for the study, 4 were ineligible based on the 
diagnostic interview (specifically 2 undergraduates met criteria for one or more anxiety disorders 
and two community members did not meet full diagnostic criteria). Additionally, one individual 
was excluded from data analysis because he emailed the principal investigator after the study 
saying that he realized he had misunderstood the rules of the Beads Task. 
 
3
 Note, these percentages do not add to 100% because individuals could be given more than one 
diagnosis. 
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the average participant had completed at least some college. 
For the purposes of diagnostic group comparisons, participants were divided into the 
following groups: (a) Non-anxious controls (NAC; no DSM-IV anxiety disorder diagnoses: n = 
26); (b) OCD group (DSM-IV diagnosis of OCD without comorbid GAD: n = 17); (c) GAD 
group (DSM-IV diagnosis of GAD without comorbid OCD: n = 23), and (d) Other anxiety 
disorders (OAD) group (DSM-IV diagnosis of another anxiety disorder without comorbid GAD 
or OCD: n = 24). Five participants were enrolled in the study with comorbid diagnoses of both 
GAD and OCD. These individuals were included in descriptive and correlational analyses, but 
were excluded from analyses examining diagnostic group differences since they could not be 
assigned to the OCD (without GAD) group or the GAD (without OCD) group and since the 
sample size of this group was too small to examine separately. The procedures for assessment 
and determination of group membership are described further below (see Procedure section). 
Measures 
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview Version 5.0 (MINI: Sheehan et al., 
1998). The MINI is a structured diagnostic interview to determine DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses 
with adequate psychometric properties and a strong correlation with the SCID-IV (Sheehan et 
al., 1997). All participants were given the anxiety disorder modules of the MINI to verify 
psychological diagnostic status. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, Short Form (IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, & 
Asmundson, 2007). The IUS-12 is a 12-item short form of the original 27-item Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al., 1994) that measures reactions to uncertainty, ambiguous 
situations, and the future (e.g., “Uncertain events upset me greatly”). This shorter version was 
selected for the current study because the 27-item version has several items that appear to pertain 
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specifically to GAD and might better account for symptoms of worry than those of other anxiety 
disorders (Carleton, Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). Participants rate 
each item on the IUS-12 from 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (Entirely characteristic of 
me). The measure consists of two subscales thought to represent approach and avoidance 
responses to uncertainty respectively (Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). 
Prospective IU (i.e., the cognitively focused dimension of IU), measures desire for predictability, 
preferences for knowing what the future holds, anxiety about future uncertain events, and active 
engagement in seeking information to increase certainty. Inhibitory IU (i.e., the behaviorally 
focused dimension of IU) measures avoidance and paralysis in the face of uncertainty. The IUS-
12 has good psychometric properties in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Carleton et al., 
2012, 2007; Helsen, Van, Vlaeyen, & Goubert, 2013; Jacoby et al., 2013; Khawaja & Yu, 2010; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). Internal consistency of the IUS-12 subscales in the present sample 
was excellent ( = .91-.92). 
Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010). The 
DOCS is a 20-item self-report measure that assesses the severity of the most consistently 
replicated OCD symptom dimensions in four subscales: (1) Concerns about germs and 
contamination, (2) Concerns about being responsible for harm, injury, or bad luck, (3) 
Unacceptable thoughts, and (4) Concerns about symmetry, completeness, and the need for things 
to be “just right.” Each subscale begins with a general description of the symptom dimension and 
specific examples of representative obsessions and compulsions. Then within each symptom 
dimension, five items (rated 0 to 4) assess the following parameters of severity over the past 
month: (a) time occupied, (b) avoidance, (c) distress, (d) interference, and (e) difficulty 
disregarding the obsessions and refraining from the compulsions. The DOCS subscales have 
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good to excellent reliability in clinical OCD, other anxiety disorder, and undergraduate samples. 
The measure also has good convergent, discriminant, and known groups validity.  Internal 
consistency of the DOCS subscales in the present sample was excellent ( = .94-.95). 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, 2001, 2005). This is a 44-item self-report instrument that measures dysfunctional 
(i.e., obsessive) beliefs hypothesized to underlie OCD symptoms. It contains three subscales: (a) 
threat overestimation and responsibility (OBQ-RT; 16 items), (b) perfectionism and need for 
certainty (OBQ-PC; 16 items), and (b) importance and control of thoughts (OBQ-ICT; 12 items). 
Individuals rate items on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Disagree very much) to 7 (Agree very 
much). The instrument has good validity, internal consistency, and test-retest reliability (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2001, 2005). Internal consistency of the OBQ-44 
subscales in the present sample was excellent ( = .93-.95). 
 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). 
The PSWQ is a 16-item scale that measures the tendency to engage in excessive, uncontrollable, 
and generalized worry. The scale assesses the intensity and excessiveness of worry without 
regard to its specific content and represents a unidimensional construct. Participants rate items on 
a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all typical) to 5 (Very typical). Sample items 
include: “My worries overwhelm me” and “Once I start worrying I can’t stop.” The PSWQ has 
good internal consistency, reliability, and criterion-related validity in undergraduate and clinical 
samples (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). 
Internal consistency of the PSWQ in the present sample was excellent ( = .95). 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & 
Swinson, 1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report measure of 
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general depression, hyperarousal, and tension over the past week. It contains three seven-item 
subscales: Depression (DASS-D), which measures dysphoric mood (e.g. sadness or 
worthlessness); Anxiety (DASS-A), which measures symptoms of physical arousal, panic 
attacks, and fear (e.g. trembling or faintness); and Stress (DASS-S), which measures symptoms 
such as tension, irritability, agitation, and overreaction to stressful events. Participants rate items 
on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very 
much, or most of the time) and then total scores are multiplied by 2 in order to compare to full 
scale DASS-42 scores. The DASS-21 has an excellent factor structure and the subscales have 
good to excellent internal consistency (Antony et al., 1998). It also has good convergent and 
known groups validity. Internal consistency of the DASS in the present sample was excellent ( 
= .94). 
Beads Task (Huq et al., 1988; Phillips & Edwards, 1966). The version of the Beads Task 
used in the current study was computerized and consisted of three levels of 
difficulty/uncertainty: (a) an easy or low uncertainty version (2 jars with a 85:15 blue to red vs. 
85:15 red to blue ratio), (b) an intermediate uncertainty version (2 jars with a 60:40 purple to 
green vs. 60:40 green to purple ratio), and (c) a difficult or high uncertainty version (3 jars with a 
44:28:28 orange to yellow to pink vs. 44:28:28 yellow to pink to orange vs. 44:28:28 pink to 
orange to yellow ratio). Following Sternheim et al. (2011)’s methodology, the maximum 
possible number of beads that could be requested before making a decision was 30 to prevent 
any ceiling effects.  
 The sequences of beads in the three conditions (easy, intermediate, and difficult) are 
listed below. The first 20 beads from the easy and intermediate conditions are modeled after 
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Garety et al. (2005). The rest of the sequences were determined using a random number 
generator. 
 Low uncertainty condition (Easy) – 85 Red (R) : 15 Blue (B) 
 Mostly Red - RRRBRRRBRRRBRRBRRRRRRBRRRBRRRR 
  
 Intermediate uncertainty condition (Intermediate) – 60 Purple (P) : 40 Green (G) 
 Mostly Purple - PGGPPGPPPGPPPPGGPGGPPGGPGGPPPP 
  
 High uncertainty condition (Difficult) – 44 Orange (O) : 28 Yellow (Y) : 28 Pink (P) 
 Mostly Orange - POOYYPOYOYYPOPOOPPOYPOYOOOPYYO 
 
Because of the possibility of memory biases and deficits (e.g., Deckersbach, Otto, Savage, Baer, 
& Jenike, 2000), and decreased memory confidence (e.g., Tolin et al., 2001) in OCD, all 
participants were able to see the beads from previous trials displayed at the bottom of their 
computer screen in order to eliminate any possible influence of memory on the Beads Task. 
 The experimenter recorded (a) the number of beads the participant selected before 
making a decision (i.e., draws to decision, DTD), (b) time taken to reach the decision, and (c) 
accuracy of the participant’s decision. Participants also completed a series of four questions (at 
the end of each version of the task) by dragging their curser along a visual analogue scale on the 
computer screen that ranges from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very much). The questions were: (a) How 
certain are you about your decision, (b) How distressed do you feel right now, (c) How confident 
do you feel about your decision, and (c) How important is it for you to get the answer right. 
Procedure 
To all participants, the study was described as a 1-hour experiment investigating 
“probability and decision-making.” Participants were informed that they would be given an 
interview by a trained research assistant; asked to answer questions on the computer about 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; and that they would complete a probability decision-making 
task on the computer with the help of the research assistant. The NAC participants signed up for 
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the study using the Participant Pool web-based software (SONA). Individuals in the patient 
groups, after hearing about the study, contacted research personnel to schedule an initial phone 
screening, and if deemed likely eligible, then scheduled an appointment to participate in the 
experiment at our laboratory. 
All participants were tested individually in the Anxiety and Stress Disorders laboratory in 
Howell Hall. The experimenter first obtained informed consent, and then administered the 
anxiety disorder modules of the MINI. Using the computer program Qualtrics, participants then 
completed a demographic survey and the study measures described above. Finally, participants 
completed the Beads Task (See Appendix A: Script of the Beads Task)—initially a practice 
version, and then the three different experimental versions (in a counterbalanced order)—with 
the aid of the experimenter (since the presence of an experimenter has been found to increase 
reliability of the task; Fear & Healy, 1997). At the end of the visit, participants were debriefed 
(See Appendix D: Debriefing Form). Students received 1-hour credit toward the research 
requirement of Introduction to Psychology, and patients received $10 as compensation for their 
time. 
RESULTS 
Missing Data 
There was a small percentage of missing data (i.e., self-report questions participants had 
skipped), so we began by analyzing the patterns of missing values. Given the relatively low 
fraction of missing information both within variables (< 2%) and within participants (≤ 5%) as 
well as the high relative efficiency of our estimates for variables with missing data ( > 99%) we 
chose to use single imputation to estimate our missing data. 
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Group Comparisons on Demographic Variables and Self-Report Measures
4
 
 Demographic characteristics of the four groups, and the results of one way ANOVA and 
chi-square tests examining group differences, appear in Table 1. As can be seen, the NAC group 
was significantly younger than two of the three clinical groups and had significantly fewer years 
of education than all three clinical groups (ps < .001, η2 > .26). Despite these group differences, 
we had no a priori reason to believe that age or years of education would be related to 
performance on the Beads Task, and thus elected to not include either of these variables as 
covariates in our ANOVA or regression analyses. There were no significant gender or 
race/ethnicity differences among the four groups.  
Group mean scores on the self-report measures of symptoms and cognitions, along with 
the results of one way ANOVAs examining group differences, appear in Table 2. In general the 
NAC group had the lowest scores on the cognitive and symptom self-report measures when 
compared to the clinical groups. Also, disorder specific measures for OCD (i.e., the DOCS) and 
GAD (i.e., the PSWQ) tended to be highest for individuals in those diagnostic groups 
respectively. 
Group Comparisons on Beads Task Performance 
Preliminary Analyses.  First, analyses were conducted to examine (a) participant 
accuracy on the three versions of Beads Task, (b) whether individuals experienced less certainty 
and confidence after completing more difficult versions of the Beads Task, and (c) whether there 
were diagnostic group differences on importance, certainty, or confidence on the three task 
versions.  
                                                        
4
 All ANOVA group comparisons were conducted removing 5 participants who had comorbid 
OCD and GAD (n = 90). 
  
 
TABLE 1: Demographic characteristics of the sample by diagnostic group 
 NAC 
n = 26 
OCD 
n = 17 
GAD 
n = 23 
OAD 
n = 24 
Test for difference Effect 
Size 
Age (years), M (SD) 18.86 (1.07)
a
 26.00 (6.21)
a,b
 31.65 (13.99)
b
 35.07 (15.49)
b
 F(3, 86) = 10.25** η
2
 = .26 
Years of Education, M (SD) 14.16 (0.83)
a
 17.12 (2.03)
b
 16.74 (1.63)
b
 17.01 (3.10)
b
 F(3, 86) = 11.43** η
2
 = .29 
Gender, % female (n) 53.8 (14) 76.5 (13) 78.3 (18) 79.2 (19) 2 (3) = 5.34 φ = .24 
Race/ethnicity, % (n)     2 (12) = 18.37 φc = .26 
     African American or Black 3.8 (1) 29.4 (5) 4.3 (1) 16.7 (4)   
     White 88.5 (23) 58.8 (10) 73.9 (17) 66.7 (16)   
     Latino or Hispanic 7.7 (2) 0 (0) 4.3 (1) 0 (0)   
     Asian 0 (0) 11.8 (2) 13.0 (3) 16.7 (4)   
     Other or Multiethnic 0 (0) 0 (0) 4.3 (1) 0 (0)   
 
 Note. ** p < .001. Means with different superscripts are significantly different from one another (p < .05) 
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TABLE 2: Means and standard deviations on self-report study measures by diagnostic group 
 NAC 
n = 26 
OCD 
n = 17 
GAD 
n = 23 
OAD 
n = 24 
F-test 
df = (3, 86) 
η2 
IUS-12       
     Prospective IU 12.77 (3.98)
a
 22.06 (6.81)
b
 23.67 (4.79)
b
 21.46 (6.28)
b
 20.02** .41 
     Inhibitory IU 6.30 (1.81)
a
 14.50 (5.27)
c
 14.03 (4.28)
b,c
 11.00 (4.54)
b
 20.30** .42 
DOCS       
     Contamination 1.27 (1.49)
a
 10.59 (5.65)
b
 3.09 (2.61)
a
 3.04 (2.84)
a
 30.99** .52 
     Responsibility for harm 1.04 (1.46)
a
 9.41 (4.86)
c
 5.91 (4.20)
b
 5.38 (3.06)
b
 21.10** .42 
     Unacceptable thoughts 1.08 (1.88)
a
 9.06 (6.90)
c
 6.52 (4.71)
b,c
 4.92 (4.03)
b
 12.30** .30 
     Symmetry 1.04 (1.64)
a
 6.29 (5.11)
b
 4.43 (4.64)
b
 4.71 (3.69)
b
 7.50** .21 
OBQ-44       
     Responsibility/Threat 45.04 (17.82)
a
 73.00 (24.51)
b
 69.90 (18.31)
b
 66.21 (17.90)
b
 10.11** .26 
     Perfectionism/Certainty 53.32 (18.29)
a
 66.32 (20.83)
a,b
 81.39 (18.80)
b
 72.58 (20.39)
b
 9.03** .24 
     Importance/Control of Thoughts 27.88 (11.71)
a
 44.06 (18.36)
b
 41.44 (18.96)
b
 35.04 (14.46)
a,b
 4.68* .14 
PSWQ 39.26 (15.09)
a
 64.93 (8.71)
b,c
 71.26 (7.21)
c 
 60.88 (12.00)
b
 35.82** .56 
DASS 11.23 (9.55)
a
 39.41 (19.50)
b
 56.40 (25.37)
b
 46.00 (24.22)
b
 22.24** .44 
 
 Note. *p < .01 ** p < .001. Means with different superscripts are significantly different from one another (p < .05) 
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There was a 100% accuracy rate on the easy version of the task, and 95% (n = 90) 
accuracy rates on both the intermediate and the difficult versions. On average, participants 
indicated that it was moderately important to answer correctly on the Beads Task (M = 43.58, SD 
= 29.98). A 3 (task version) x 4 (group) mixed ANOVA on task importance revealed a main 
effect of task difficulty, F(2, 172) = 4.41, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .05. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests 
revealed that participants rated the easy version of the task (M = 43.28, SD = 30.63) as slightly 
more important than the intermediate version (M = 40.08, SD = 29.26), t(89) = 3.15, p = .002 
(Cohen’s d = .11). Examination of the effect size of this difference, however, suggests that the 
magnitude of this effect is relatively modest, and does not appear to be practically meaningful. 
There were no other significant differences (ps > .12). There was no main effect of diagnostic 
group on task importance, F(3, 86) = 1.63, p = .19, ηp
2 
= .05, and no task version by diagnostic 
group interaction, F(6, 172) = .88, p = .51, ηp
2 
=.03.  
Next, a 3 (task version) x 4 (group) mixed ANOVA on level of certainty after completing 
the task revealed a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 172) = 109.12, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .56. Post-hoc 
paired samples t-tests revealed that participants reported being significantly less certain after 
completing the difficult version (M = 48.33, SD = 22.49) compared to the intermediate version 
(M = 62.03, SD = 20.90), t(89) = 7.10, p  <.001, (Cohen’s d = .63). In addition, participants 
reported being significantly less certain after completing the intermediate version compared to 
the easy version (M = 75.81, SD = 20.22), t(89) = 7.93, p  <.001, (Cohen’s d = .67). Thus, as 
hoped, the more difficult the task version, the more uncertain participants felt after deciding. 
There was no main effect of diagnostic group on certainty, F(3, 86) = .96, p = .42, ηp
2 
= .03. 
There also was no task version by diagnostic group interaction, F(6, 172) = .98, p = .44, ηp
2 
= 
.03. 
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The same pattern was observed for the 3 (task version) x 4 (group) ANOVA on level of 
confidence after completing the task. First, there was a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 172) = 
96.57, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .53. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed that participants reported 
being significantly less confident after completing the difficult (M = 45.79, SD = 23.53) as 
compared to the intermediate version (M = 57.36, SD = 24.58), t(89) = 5.57, p  <.001 (Cohen’s d 
= .48). In addition, participants reported significantly less confidence after completing the 
intermediate, as compared to the easy version (M = 73.68, SD = 21.15), t(89) = 8.50, p  <.001 
(Cohen’s d = .71). There was no main effect of diagnostic group on confidence, F(3, 86) = .98,   
p = .41, ηp
2 
= .03. There also was no task version by diagnostic group interaction, F(6, 172) = 
1.30, p = .26, ηp
2 
= .04. 
Draws to Decision. Figure 1 shows the mean number of beads requested (or “drawn”) 
before making a decision on the Beads Task by group for the easy, intermediate, and difficult 
task versions. To examine the hypothesized group differences (OCD and GAD > OAD > NAC) 
on DTD, we computed a 3 (task version) x 4 (group) ANOVA with DTD as the dependent 
variable. This analysis revealed a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 172) = 98.91, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.54. As is clear from Figure 1, post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed that participants requested 
more beads on the difficult version of the task than on the intermediate version, and on the 
intermediate, than the easy version (ps < .001, Cohen’s ds > .70). There was no main effect of 
diagnostic group, F(3, 86) = .62, p = .60, ηp
2 
= .02. There also was no task version by group 
interaction, F(6, 172) = .85, p = .53, ηp
2 
= .03. To test our hypothesis that group differences 
would emerge for the intermediate version of the Beads Task in particular, we computed planned 
comparisons on DTD for this version of the task. These simple contrasts, however, revealed no 
significant differences between groups (ps > .05). 
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Figure 1: Draws to decision by diagnostic group for each version of the Beads Task 
 
Note. Different uppercase superscripts represent significant task version differences (p < .05).  
 
Time.
5
 Figure 2 shows the mean time (in seconds) that elapsed before making a decision 
on the Beads Task by group for the easy, intermediate, and difficult task versions. A 3 (task 
version) x 4 (group) exploratory ANOVA with time to decision as the dependent variable 
revealed a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 172) = 63.94, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .43. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed that participants took more time to decide in 
the difficult, than in the intermediate version of the task; and on the intermediate, than on the 
                                                        
5
 Two participants were identified who had time scores on the intermediate version of the Beads 
Task that were > 3 SDs above the mean. ANOVA analyses were computed both with and 
without these two outliers, and removing the outliers did not change the significance of the 
results; thus, to be conservative, the outliers were retained for analyses. 
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easy version (ps < .001, Cohen’s ds > .65). There was no main effect of group, F(3, 86) = .56,    
p = .64, ηp
2 
= .02. There also was no task version by diagnostic group interaction, F(6, 172) = 
.73, p = .63, ηp
2 
= .03. 
 
Figure 2: Time to decision by diagnostic group for each version of the Beads Task 
 
Note. Different uppercase superscripts represent significant task version differences (p < .05).  
 
Distress. Figure 3 shows the mean distress level reported by participants after making a 
decision by Beads Task level and by group. A 3 (task version) x 4 (group) exploratory ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of task difficulty on distress, F(2, 172) = 17.72, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .17. As is 
clear from Figure 3, post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed that participants were more 
distressed by the difficult version than by the intermediate version (p = .01, Cohen’s d = .18), 
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and by the intermediate version than the easy version (p = .001, Cohen’s d = .27). There was also 
a main effect of diagnostic group on distress, F(3, 86) = 6.98, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .20. Post hoc tests 
revealed that the NAC group was significantly less distressed after completing the Beads Task 
than were the GAD and OAD groups (ps = .001; who were not significantly different from one 
another, p = .99). The OCD group did not have significantly different levels of distress than any 
of the other diagnostic groups (ps > .12). There also was no task version by diagnostic group 
interaction on distress, F(6, 172) = 1.61, p = .15, ηp
2 
= .05.  
 
Figure 3: Level of distress by diagnostic group for each version of the Beads Task 
 
Note. Different uppercase superscripts represent significant task version differences (p < .05). 
Different lowercase superscripts represent significant diagnostic group differences (p < .05) 
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Correlations between Beads Task Performance and Other Study Measures 
Correlations between the primary Beads Task variables (DTD, time to reach a decision, 
and distress after having decided) and the self-report symptom and cognition measures appear in 
Table 3. A Bonferroni corrected alpha of .005 was used to correct for multiple tests within each 
task version (.05 / 11). As can be seen, contrary to our hypothesis, neither the number of draws to 
decision nor the time to decision was associated with any self-report measures. However, for the 
most part, level of distress was significantly and moderately positively associated with self-
report measures of uncertainty and OC related cognitions. Distress on the difficult version of the 
Beads Task was also significantly positively associated with the DOCS Harm subscale, and 
Beads Task-related distress (across all three versions) was significantly and moderately 
positively associated with the PSWQ and DASS. 
Uncertainty Related Cognitions Predicting Beads Task Performance 
Regression diagnostics identified no violations of normality or homoscedasticity. Any 
outliers with standardized residual ≥ 3 SDs above the mean were identified for further 
examination. Although, a few cases were identified, given the variability in these dependent 
variables no outliers were considered overly problematic (i.e., standardized residuals: Easy DTD 
< 3.60 SD; Easy time, < 3.72 SD; Difficult time, < 3.38 SD; and Intermediate distress, < 3.48 
SD). For time to decision on the intermediate task version, however, one outlier was identified 
with a standardized residual of 7.75 SD. Thus, regressions involving intermediate time as a DV 
were calculated both with and without the outlier (with no changes in significance observed). In 
order to be conservative, regression analyses with the full sample are reported here.
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: Correlations between Beads Task measures and self-report measures (n = 95). 
 
 
Task Version 
Prospective 
IU 
Inhibitory 
IU 
OBQ-
RT 
OBQ-
PC 
OBQ-
ICT 
DOCS 
Contamination 
DOCS 
Harm 
DOCS 
Unacceptable 
Thoughts 
DOCS 
Symmetry 
PSWQ DASS 
DTD Easy -.04 -.05 .06 .04 .09 .01 -.05 .02 .15 -.08 -.01 
Intermediate  .06 .01 .20 .24 .12 -.05 .06 -.01 .11 .02 -.05 
Hard .01 -.03 .12 .12 .02 -.23 .10 -.07 -.03 -.03 .02 
Time Easy .08 .14 .13 .12 -.02 .04 .06 .10 .18 .06 .18 
 Intermediate  .09 .10 .22 .19 .04 .01 .03 .06 .26 .10 .10 
 Hard .01 .06 .09 .05 -.04 -.14 .08 -.01 .10 -.05 .01 
Distress Easy .25 .31
*
 .31
*
 .30
*
 .18 .01 .16 .19 .27 .32
*
 .35
*
 
Intermediate  .35
*
 .38
*
 .43
*
 .42
*
 .27
*
 -.01 .27 .21 .26 .42
*
 .43
*
 
Hard .39
*
 .44
*
 .44
*
 .49
*
 .32
*
 .05 .32
*
 .24 .27 .48
*
 .49
*
 
 
* p < .005 
2
3
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Tolerance statistics (≥ .33) and variation inflation factors (VIF; ≤ 3.05) were adequate to satisfy 
the condition of independent predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) indicating that 
multicollinearity was within acceptable ranges. Thus, the assumptions for our regression 
analyses were met. A Bonferroni corrected alpha of .017 was used to correct for multiple tests 
for each Beads Task version (.05 / 3). 
To examine the IU self-report measures (IUS-12 and OBQ-PC) as predictors of each 
measure of performance on the Beads Task (i.e., DTD, time, distress) at the different levels of 
task difficulty (i.e., easy, intermediate, and difficult), we conducted a series of hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses. In each set of regressions, the DASS was entered in Step 1 and the 
two IUS-12 subscales (Prospective IU and Inhibitory IU) and the OBQ-PC were entered 
simultaneously in Step 2. 
Predicting Draws to Decision. In the first regression predicting DTD on the easy (i.e., 
low uncertainty) version of the Beads Task, the DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant 
variance (R
2
 < .001; p = .92). When the IU self-report measures were added in Step 2, the 
amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .01, p = .77. The final model accounted 
for only 1% of the variance, F(4, 90) = .28, p = .89. 
In the second regression predicting DTD on the intermediate version of the Beads Task, 
the DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant variance (R
2
 = .002; p = .66). When the IU 
self-report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, 
ΔR2 = .10, p = .02. The final model accounted for 11% of the variance, F(4, 90) = 2.66, p = .04. 
In the third regression predicting DTD on the difficult (i.e., high uncertainty) version of 
the Beads Task, the DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant variance (R
2
 < .001; p = .87). 
When the IU self-report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase 
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significantly, ΔR2 = .03, p = .38. The final model only accounted for 3% of the variance, F(4, 90) 
= .79, p = .54. 
Predicting Time to Decision. In the first regression predicting time to decision on the 
easy version of the Beads Task, the DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant variance (R
2
 = 
.03; p = .08). When the IU self-report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did 
not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .01, p = .77. The final model accounted for only 4% of the 
variance, F(4, 90) = 1.03, p = .40. 
In the second regression predicting time on the intermediate version of the Beads Task, 
the DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant variance (R
2
 = .01; p = .34). When the IU self-
report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 
= .03, p = .39. The final model accounted for only 4% of the variance, F(4, 90) = .99, p = . 42. 
In the third regression predicting time on the difficult version of the Beads Task, the 
DASS (Step 1) did not account for significant variance (R
2
 < .001; p = .99). When the IU self-
report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 
= .01, p = .82. The final model only accounted for 1% of the variance, F(4, 90) = .23, p = .92. 
Predicting Distress after Decision. In the first regression predicting distress after having 
decided on the easy version of the Beads Task, the DASS (Step 1) accounted for significant 
variance (R
2
 = .12; p = .001). When the IU self-report measures were added in Step 2, the 
amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .03, p = .35. The final model accounted 
for 15% of the variance, F(4, 90) = 3.97, p = .005. 
In the second regression predicting distress on the intermediate version of the Beads 
Task, the DASS (Step 1) accounted for significant variance (R
2
 = .19; p < .001). When the IU 
self-report measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, 
ΔR2 = .06, p = .08. The final model accounted for 24% of the variance, F(4, 90) = 7.25, p < .001. 
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In the third regression predicting distress on the difficult version of the Beads Task, the 
DASS (Step 1) accounted for significant variance (R
2
 = .24; p < .001). When the IU self-report 
measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance increased significantly, ΔR2 = .09, p = 
.009. Only the OBQ-PC subscale was a significant individual predictor of distress (β = .35, sr = 
.25, t = 2.87, p = .005). The final model accounted for 33% of the variance, F(4, 90) = 11.05, p < 
.001. 
Anxiety Symptoms Predicting Beads Task Performance 
To examine the GAD and OCD symptom measures (DOCS subscales and PSWQ) as 
predictors of each measure of performance on the Beads Task at the different levels difficulty we 
conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses. In each set of regressions, the 
DASS was entered in Step 1 and the DOCS subscales and the PSWQ were entered 
simultaneously in Step 2. 
Predicting Draws to Decision. In the first regression predicting DTD on the easy version 
of the Beads Task, after accounting for the DASS (in Step 1),
6
 when the anxiety symptom 
measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .06, 
p = .38. The final model accounted for only 6% of the variance, F(6, 88) = .89, p = .50. 
 In the second regression predicting DTD on the intermediate version of the Beads Task, 
after accounting for the DASS (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures were added in 
Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .04, p = .62. The final model 
accounted for only 4% of the variance, F(6, 88) = .62, p = .72. 
In the third regression predicting DTD on the difficult version of the Beads Task, after 
accounting for the DASS (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures were added in Step 2, 
                                                        
6
 Note that Step 1 statistics when the DASS is added to the regression are the same as Step 1 in 
the previous section and thus, for the sake of brevity, these numbers are not repeated. 
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the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .11, p = .07. The final model 
accounted for 11% of the variance, F(6, 88) = 1.77, p = .12. 
Predicting Time to Decision. In the first regression predicting time to decision on the 
easy version of the Beads Task, after accounting for the DASS (in Step 1), when the anxiety 
symptom measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, 
ΔR2 = .02, p = .81. The final model accounted for only 6% of the variance, F(6, 88) = .87, p = 
.52. 
In the second regression predicting time on the intermediate version of the Beads Task, 
after accounting for the DASS (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures were added in 
Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .08, p = .20. The final model 
accounted for 9% of the variance, F(6, 88) = 1.41, p = .22. 
In the third regression predicting time on the difficult version of the Beads Task, after 
accounting for the DASS (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures were added in Step 2, 
the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .08, p = .23. The final model 
accounted for 8% of the variance, F(6, 88) = 1.18, p = .32. 
Predicting Distress after Decision. In the first regression predicting distress after having 
decided on the easy version of the Beads Task, after the DASS accounted for significant variance 
(in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance 
did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .04, p = .48. The final model accounted for 16% of the 
variance, F(6, 88) = 2.84, p = .01. 
In the second regression predicting distress on the intermediate version of the Beads 
Task, after the DASS accounted for significant variance (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom 
measures were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .06, 
p = .23. The final model accounted for 25% of the variance, F(6, 88) = 4.80, p < .001. 
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In the third regression predicting distress on the difficult version of the Beads Task, after 
the DASS accounted for significant variance (in Step 1), when the anxiety symptom measures 
were added in Step 2, the amount of variance did not increase significantly, ΔR2 = .06, p = .22. 
The final model accounted for 30% of the variance, F(6, 88) = 6.14, p < .001. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Researchers have repeatedly highlighted the importance of identifying cognitive 
processes that span anxiety disorders for the purpose of developing transdiagnostic models and 
treatments for problems with anxiety (e.g., Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004). IU is one such 
process that appears to be associated with various anxiety disorders; yet to date, IU is only 
reliably measured using self-report instruments. In vivo tasks, such as the Beads Task, that 
induce uncertainty in the laboratory could therefore provide novel methods for examining the 
behavioral correlates of IU across anxiety disorders and contribute to theoretical formulations of 
these problems. In the current study, participants appeared to follow the task instructions, and 
they indicated that identifying the correct jar was moderately important to them. In addition, as 
expected, the more difficult versions of the task were associated with less certainty and 
confidence in decisions, suggesting that the tasks induced uncertainty as they became 
progressively more difficult. 
Although, as hypothesized, participants requested more beads as the Beads Task became 
more difficult, contrary to our prediction DTD did not demonstrate known groups validity, as 
there were no group differences on DTD on any of the three versions. This is in contrast to 
previous findings that individuals with OCD and with elevated worry required more evidence 
before making decisions than individuals with other psychological disorders and NACs (Fear & 
Healy, 1997; Fitch & Cougle, 2013; Foa et al., 2003; Milner et al., 1971; Toffolo et al., 2013; 
Volans, 1976). Notably, although statistically significant, the differences observed in previous 
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studies between diagnostic groups on DTD were quite small, e.g., ≤ 1 bead (Fear & Healy, 1997; 
Huq et al., 1988). Thus, the current study adds to the literature and calls into question whether 
behavioral responses are clinically useful in differentiating those with anxiety disorders from 
NACs.  
In exploratory analyses examining time to decision and distress after having decided, 
participants took more time to decide and were more distressed following their decision the more 
difficult the Beads Task version. Although there were no group differences on time, individuals 
in the GAD and OAD groups were significantly more distressed after completing the task than 
those in the NAC group. Sternheim, Startup and colleagues (2011) were the first to look at self-
reported distress on the Beads Task in a sample of individuals with eating disorders. The 
differences in the current study are in line with their previous findings that individuals with 
eating disorders are more distressed than healthy controls on the Beads Task (Sternheim, Startup, 
et al., 2011). 
Contrary to our hypotheses, self-reported IU was not associated with DTD on any of the 
three Beads Task versions. This finding was surprising given the relatively strong associations 
reported in previous studies using non-clinical participants (i.e., rs = .28-43) (Ladouceur et al., 
1997), but is in line with the null findings from a more recent study with eating disorder patients 
(Sternheim, Startup, et al., 2011). Methodological differences might have played a role in these 
contradictory results. Specifically, in Ladouceur et al. (1997), actual jars filled with marbles were 
used (versus images of jars and beads on the computer in the current study and in Sternheim, 
Startup et al., 2011), and it is possible that the interactive component of having an experimenter 
hand the participant each marble one at time may have heightened the participants’ social 
pressure to arrive at a correct answer, although future research would need to examine this 
explanation. 
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In exploratory analyses, we found that self-reported IU was similarly not associated with 
time to decision, but was positively associated with level of distress after having decided on all 
three versions of the task; and this relationship remained even after controlling for general 
depression, anxiety and stress for the difficult task version. In addition, the OBQ-PC emerged as 
a significant individual predictor of task-related distress. Why did the OBQ-PC but not the IUS-
12 uniquely predict decision-related distress? While both measures assess uncertainty-related 
cognitions and are strongly correlated, they are not completely redundant (r = .67 in the current 
study). Indeed, these measures were developed by teams of GAD and OCD researchers 
respectively who conceptualized and defined IU in slightly different ways. While the IUS-12 
items measure the variety of ways that people “react to the uncertainties of life,” the OBQ-PC 
assesses perfectionism/certainty as “attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes hold.” As has been 
suggested by previous researchers (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011), when similar items are compared on 
these two measures, the OBQ tends to be worded more severely than the IUS. Finally, the IUS-
12 simply measures uncertainty cognitions while the empirically derived OBQ-PC subscale 
measures both uncertainty and perfectionism (which were determined to be a single construct 
using factor analytic methods). 
Contrary to our hypotheses, responsibility/checking concerns and worry were not 
associated with DTD on any of the Beads Task versions. Previous studies have also failed to find 
hypothesized relationships between quantity of information requested and either obsessional 
symptoms (Foa et al., 2003) or worry (Ladouceur et al., 1997). This could be due to the fact that 
the Beads Task is a simple probabilistic inference task that is not tied in any way to the specific 
concerns of people with OCD or GAD. It might also be that decision-making difficulties are 
associated with transdiagnostic maladaptive cognitive biases that are not directly tied to disorder-
specific symptoms.  
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Our exploratory analyses also suggested that self-report symptom measures were not 
associated with time to decision. In contrast, participants’ self-reported levels of general 
depression, anxiety, and stress were positively associated with distress following all three 
versions of the Beads Task. OCD-related symptoms of responsibility for harm were associated 
with distress after deciding on the difficult version of the task, but this relationship disappeared 
after controlling for general depression, anxiety, and stress. Similarly, symptoms of worry were 
positively associated with distress following all three task versions, but this relationship again 
disappeared after controlling for depression, anxiety, and stress. This pattern of findings suggests 
that while symptoms of OCD and GAD are related to distress on the Beads Task, decision-
related distress is better accounted for by general distress measures than by disorder-specific 
symptoms. 
Overall, therefore, it appears that while the Beads Task successfully induced task-related 
uncertainty in the laboratory as the probabilistic decision became progressively more difficult, 
one’s general cognitive bias of IU did not predict performance on this task on either of the 
observable performance related measures (DTD and time to decision). IU did, however, predict 
one’s subjective experience of in vivo distress after having decided (even after controlling for 
general depression, anxiety, and stress on the difficult task version). These two findings suggest 
that it is the emotional response to the Beads Task, as opposed to the observed behavioral 
responses (i.e., DTD, time to decision), that has diagnostic validity and is related to self-report 
IU.  
The findings of this study raise several avenues for future research in the area of 
behavioral measurement of IU. For example, the Beads Task itself could be altered based on the 
current findings. Although there was a range in distress levels across individuals, the mean level 
of distress was relatively low overall (and we received informal feedback from some participants 
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upon debriefing that they were not distressed by the task). Thus, incentives for identifying the 
correct answer (e.g., money, Ladouceur et al., 2000; Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011), or more 
aptly for anxiety disorders, pairing a negative stimulus with incorrect answers (e.g., a mild 
electric shock, Nelson & Shankman, 2011), might amplify the distress participants feel when 
making their decision. Future work could also design IU related tasks that are more personally 
relevant to disorder specific concerns, such as whether one correctly turned off the stove. Despite 
existing research in this area (Fitch & Cougle, 2013; Foa et al., 2003), to date no studies have 
used an idiographic approach to stimuli selection, which would maximize external validity of 
these tasks.  
Furthermore, future research might explore additional self-report constructs that may 
better explain Beads Task performance. Need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994), for example, is a cognitive construct related to IU (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & 
Thompson, 2008) that is defined as the desire for “an answer on a given topic, any 
answer…compared to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1990). It may be that certain 
individuals have a decision-making style that involves requesting more and more information in 
order to feel certain, whereas others use a more avoidant technique and make a quick decision in 
order to avoid the uncertainty itself (and these opposite styles in responding may have 
contributed to the null findings using DTD in the current study). Indeed, in a previous study 
individuals with high trait anxiety requested fewer pieces of information on a variety of 
uncertainty-inducing tasks, and the authors concluded that these individuals made hasty 
decisions with the goal of reducing uncertainty, even at the expense of correctness (Bensi & 
Giusberti, 2007). Thus, future research measuring need for closure and obtaining qualitative data 
as to how participants made their decision would help the development of future tasks.  
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The present study has a number of limitations that should be considered. First, only the 
anxiety disorder modules of the MINI were administered, thus it is unknown what co-occurring 
conditions participants were struggling with (e.g., depression). Second, the sample had relatively 
high comorbidity, with a substantial proportion of individuals meeting criteria for more than one 
anxiety disorder. This prevented assigning participants to mutually exclusive diagnostic groups. 
Third, due to the relatively modest sample size, individuals in the OAD group were combined 
rather than considered individually. Fourth, the NAC group was significantly younger and had 
significantly fewer years of education than the clinical groups. However, we had no a priori 
reason to believe that age or years of education would be related to performance on the Beads 
Task. Finally, the sample was primarily Caucasian, which may limit the generalizability of the 
results to other racial/ethnic groups. The literature to date suggests that there are not differences 
in IU based on race and ethnicity (Norton, 2005), although more research in this area is certainly 
needed. 
In summary, therefore, the current study examined the validity of a probabilistic 
inference task, the Beads Task, as a behavioral measure of IU in a clinical anxiety disorder 
sample. While the Beads Task successfully induced task-related uncertainty as the probabilistic 
decision became progressively more difficult, self-reported IU did not predict performance on 
this task using either of the observable performance related measures (i.e., draws to decision, or 
time to decision), and there were no diagnostic group differences on these outcome measures. 
Self-report IU did, however, predict one’s subjective experience of in vivo distress after having 
decided, and individuals in the GAD and OAD groups were significantly more distressed after 
completing the task than those in the NAC group. While symptoms of OCD and GAD were 
related to distress on the Beads Task, decision-related distress was better accounted for by 
general distress measures than by disorder-specific symptoms. Overall, this pattern of results 
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suggests that it is one’s emotional response to the Beads Task, as opposed to one’s observed 
behavioral responses, that has diagnostic validity. 
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APPENDIX A: SCRIPT FOR THE BEADS TASK 
Low Uncertainty Version (85:15) 
“There are two jars that each contain 100 beads. The mainly blue jar has 85 blue beads and 15 
red beads. The mainly red jar has 85 red beads and 15 blue beads. The beads have been mixed up 
in the jars.  
 
One of the jars has been chosen at random. Both jars have an equal probability of being selected 
(50:50). Beads will be drawn from the selected jar and shown on the screen. The beads will 
always come from the same jar and will be put back in the jar afterwards so that the proportions 
of beads always stays the same. The jar will be shaken up between each draw.  
 
It is your job to decide which jar the beads have come from. You may see as many beads as you 
like before making a decision. The beads you have seen from previous trials will be displayed at 
the bottom of the screen to help with your decision.  
 
After each bead has been shown on the screen, you can either: (1) Ask for another bead by 
pressing the space bar once, OR (2) You can tell me that you know which jar the beads are 
coming from and whether it is the mainly red jar or the mainly blue jar.  
 
Remember: The beads will always come from the same jar; the beads will be put back in the 
same jar afterwards; you can see as many beads as you like before you decide which jar the 
beads are coming from; only decide when you are as certain as possible. Do you have any 
questions?” 
 
Note: The Intermediate Uncertainty Version (60:40) and the High Uncertainty Version 
(44:28:28) have the same script as above, with changes only for the probability ratios. 
 
 
36 
 
APPENDIX B: DEBRIEFING FORM 
Probability and Decision-Making 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. This handout is provided to tell you a little 
more about the purpose of the study. 
 
In this experiment, we are studying how people complete a probability decision-making task 
known as the Beads Task. In particular, we are interested in what factors may influence how 
many beads people need to see before they are ready to decide from which jar the series of beads 
are being drawn. Some of the factors we are investigating that may influence performance on this 
task are depression and anxiety symptoms, stress, worry, and a variety of cognitive beliefs.  
One cognitive belief we are particularly interested in learning more about is intolerance of 
uncertainty (IU). Individuals who are high in intolerance of uncertainty find uncertainty to be 
stressful, upsetting, and negative. They also may have difficulty functioning in uncertain or 
ambiguous situations. Thus, we are interested in how people who are high in IU perform the 
three different levels of uncertainty of this task: (a) an easy or low uncertainty version, (b) a 
medium or intermediate uncertainty version, and (c) a hard or high uncertainty version. Requests 
to see additional beads can be conceptualized as a measure of IU, with individuals high in 
intolerance of uncertainty needing to see more beads before feeling “certain” about making a 
decision.  
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) have high self-report ratings of IU, perhaps even more 
so than patients with other anxiety disorders. Undergraduates enrolled in Psychology 101, and 
individuals with an anxiety disorder diagnosis (including OCD and GAD) will be completing 
this study in order to see whether there are any differences between these groups, and whether 
there are any specific symptom dimensions that are associated with performance on this task. 
 
If you would like more information about the study or if you have any questions or concerns, 
please write to Ryan Jane Jacoby (rjjacoby@unc.edu) or Dr. Jon Abramowitz 
(jabramowitz@unc.edu), the principal researchers for this study. If you are interested in being 
sent a copy of the report written from this study data, you may also email Ryan. 
 
If you feel that you would like additional help or a counseling referral, you may contact the UNC 
Counseling and Wellness Center (919-966-3658) or the Evergreen Psychology Clinic (919-962-
6906). 
 
Thank you again for your participation!  
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